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MARJORIE E. GOODWINE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPE. 
RIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respond. 
ent; DON F. GOODWINE, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Divorce-Separate Maintenance-.Turisdiction.-In an action 
for separate maintenance, domicile is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for jurisdiction. An action for separate maintenance 
is essentially one for support, seeking a money judgment 
against defendant, and jurisdiction does not depend on domi· 
cile but on acquiring personal jurisdiction over the husband 
or quasi·in.rem jurisdiction over his property. 
[2] Id.-Separate Ma.intenance--Jurisdiction.-In a separate main· 
tenance action, once quasi.in.rem jurisdiction is established 
the court can award a money judgment to the extent of de· 
fendant's interest in the property attached. 
[3] Id.-8eparate Maintenance-.Turisdiction.-The residence re-
quirements applicable to plaintiff in divorce actions are in· 
applicable in actions for separate maintenance. 
[4] Appearance-General Appearance-Motions.-Defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss a separate maintenance action against him on 
the theory that the trial court lacked subject-matter juris-
diction was not a general appearance giving the court personal 
jurisdiction over him, since the challenge to subject.matter 
jurisdiction was not inconsistent with a challenge to personal 
jurisdiction, and, moreover, since the court must dismiss on 
the ground of lack of subject.matter jurisdiction on its own 
motion, an appropriate challenge thereto aids the court in 
performing its duty. (Overruling Judson v. Superior Court, 
21 Ca1.2d 11 [129 P.2d 361].) 
[5] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-In determining the 
applicability of the doctrine of fOTUm notJ conveniens, a court 
must consider the public interest as well as the private inter· 
ests of the litigants, and such factors as the ease of access of 
proof, the availability and cost of obtaining witnesses, the 
possibility of h'arassment of defendant in litigating in an in· 
convenient forum, the enforceability of the judgment, the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 222; Am.Jur., 
Husband and Wife (1st ed § 401). 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appearance, §§ 21·24; Am.Jur.2d, Appear. 
ance, § 21. 
McX. Dig. References: [1.3] Divorce, § 154; [4] Appearance, 
§ 11; [5.7] Courts, § 24. 
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burden on the community in litigating matters not of local 
concern, and the desirability of litigating local matters in 
local courts. 
[6] Id.-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-Unless the balance is 
strongly in defendant's favor after considering the factors re-
lating to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, plaintiff's chQice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 
[7] Id.-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-A determination that 
a plaintiff commencing an action in California is domiciled 
here ordinarily precludes granting defendant's motion for dis-
missal on the ground of forum non conveniens. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to vacate an order dismissing a sepa-
rate maintenance action and to compel such court to take 
jurisdiction of the action. Roger Alton Pfaff, Judge. Per-
emptory writ granted. 
Richard M. Moore and Cooper & Nelsen for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William F. 
Stewart, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Newman & Newman and Nathan Newby, Jr., for Real Party 
in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-On October 8, 1964, plaintiff, Marjorie 
E. Goodwine, began an action for separate maintenance 
against her husband, Don F. Goodwine. A writ of attach-
ment was levied upon defendant's real property in the County 
of Los Angeles, giving the trial court quasi-in-rem juris-
diction. (Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 415 [170 P.2d 
670] ; Nichols v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 589, 599 [36 P.2d 
380, 95 A.L.R. 894]; Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 275 
[47 P. 37, 56 Am.St.Rep. 97, 37 L.R.A. 626].) Plaintiff se-
cured an order for service by publication based on an affidavit 
that defendant resided out of the state (see Code Civ. Pr~., 
§ 412), and defendant was personally served in Mexico (see 
Code Civ. Proc., § 413). Defendant moved to quash the writ 
of attachment, the service of summons and complaint, and to 
dismiss the action, on the ground that the trial court was 
without jurisdiction. The trial court granted defendant's 
motion and dismissed the action, staying its order pending 
appellate review. Plaintiff then filed this petition for a writ 
of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order dis-
missing the action. 
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Plaintiff and defendant were married in Reno, Nevada, on 
April 1, 1955. They lived in California until March 1963, 
when they moved to Mexico to live in retirement. Defendant 
obtained a resident's visa and became a domiciliary of Mexico. 
Plaintiff obtained a tourist visa because of local regulations, 
but she also intended to become a permanent resident of 
Mexico. On September 3, 1964, plaintiff left defendant and 
went to Los Angeles to reside with her sister, allegedly be-
cause he treated plaintiff with extreme cruelty. Plaintiff then 
brought the action for separate maintenance, seeking support 
of $1,000 per month, attorney's fees, and costs out of defend-
ant's property within the state. 
Defendant contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction 
in an action for separate maintenance when np,ither party is 
domiciled in the state. There is no merit in this contention. 
In an action for divorce, domicile is dispositive, since "the 
domicile of one spouse within a State gives power to that 
State . . . to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted." 
(Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 229-230 [65 
S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366].) The state in 
which one spouse is domiciled is deemed to have sufficient 
interest to terminate the marriage. Thus, a state has the 
power to grant an ex parte divorce to a domiciliary wife with-
out personal jurisdiction over the husband or quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction over his property. (Williams v. North Carolina I, 
317 U.S. 287, 303 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 
1273].) [1] In an action for separate maintenance, how-
ever, domicile is neither sufficient nor necessary for juris-
diction. An action for separate maintenance is essentially 
an action for support (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) 
Jurisdiction, § llO, p. 375), seeking a money judgment against 
the defendant. Jurisdiction does not depend on domicile but 
on acquiring personal jurisdiction over the husband or quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction over his property. (Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 [77 S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456]; 
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406, 415 [170 P.2d 670] ; 1 Wit-
kin, Cal. ProcedUFe (1954) Jurisdiction, § llO, pp. 375-376; see 
Code Civ. Proc., § 537.) [2] Once quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is 
established, the court can award a money judgment to the 
extent of the defendant's interest in the property attached. 
(Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra, 28 Cal.2d 406, 415.) [3] The 
residence requirements applicable to the plaintiff in divorce 
actions (Civ. Code, §128) are inapplicable in actions for sep-
arate maintenance. (Hiner v. Hiner, 153 Cal. 254, 260 [94 
) 
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P. 1044].) Exercising jurisdiction in these cases does not 
encourage forum-shopping, since the court will not necessarily 
apply the substantive law of the forum under the applicable 
conflict of laws rules. (See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 
588,596 [12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].) 
[4] Plaintiff contends that since defendant moved to dis-
miss the action, he made a general appearance giving the trial 
court personal jurisdiction over him, rather than quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction. We agree with plaintiff that defendant made a 
motion to dismiss. Even though the request for dismissal is 
found only in the title of defendant's motion, the motion rests 
on a theory that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
when neither party was domiciled in the state. Defendant 
thus challenged the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, 
as well as its personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree 
with plaintiff, however, that a motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-mattter jurisdiction is a general appearance. 
" , [W] here the defendant appears and asks some relief which 
can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has juris-
diction of cause and person, it is a submission to the jurisdic-
tion of the court as completely as if he had been regularly 
served with process, whether such an appearance by its terms 
be limited to a special appearance or not.''' (Security Loan 
&- Trust Co. v. Boston &- S. R. Fruit Co., 126 Cal. 418, 422 
[58 P. 941, 59 P. 296J ; In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 392 [58 P. 
22J; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Jurisdiction, § 72, 
p. 342.) An answer, a demurrer, and a motion to strike con-
stitute a general appearance (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014), since a 
court does not decide questions raised by such pleadings at the 
behest of persons over whom it has no jurisdiction. A court 
need not have jurisdiction over the person, however, to dis-
miss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the court 
must dismiss on that ground on its own motion. (Morris v. 
Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326-327 [9 S.Ct. 289, 32 L.Ed. 690]; 
Abelleira v. D1'stn~ct Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 302-303 
[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) Thus, a challenge to the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court is not inconsistent 
with a challenge to personal jurisdiction. Moreover, since the 
court must dismi~s on its own motion, an appropriate challenge 
to subject-matter jurisdiction aids the court in performing 
its duty. The defendant should therefore be allowed to point 
out lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without making a gen-
eral appearance. Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Ca1.2d 11 [129 
P.2d 361], is to the contrary, but it has often been criticized 
) 
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(see 31Ca1.L.Rev. 342; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954), 
§ 76, p. 346) and is overruled. 
Defendant contends that even if the trial court has quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction, it properly refused to exercise it under 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court, how-
ever, has not yet considered whether the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens applies to this case, since it treated defendant's 
motion as being "for the sole purpose of objecting to the 
court's jurisdiction." Since the court has jurisdiction of 
the subject matter, it can now consider the applicability of 
that doctrine, which is accepted in this jurisdiction (Price 
v. Atchison, T. ~ S.D. Ry. Co., 42 Ca1.2d 577, 583 [268 P.2d 
457, 43 A.L.R.2d 756]) and applies to actions for support 
(Wilburn v. Wilburn, (D.C.) 192 A.2d 797, 800; Melvin 
v. Melvin, 129 F.2d 39, 40 [76 App.D.C. 56]). [5] In deter-
mining the applicability of the doctrine, the court must con-
sider the public interest as well as the private interests of the 
litigants. The court must consider such factors as the ease 
of access of proof, the availability and cost of obtaining wit-
nesses, the possibility of harassment of the defendant in liti-
gating in an inconvenient forum, the enforceability of the judg-
ment, the burden on the community in litigating matters not 
of local concern, and the desirability of litigating local mat-
ters in local courts. [6] '" [U] nless the balance is strongly 
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum 
should rarely be disturbed.''' (Price v. Atchison,T. &- S.F. 
Ry. Co., supra, 42 Ca1.2d 577, 585.) The trial court must 
in the first instance consider these factors in determining 
whether to apply the doctrine. Thus plaintiff alleges mis-
treatmt'nt throughout the marriage, both in California and 
in Mexico, and the trial court must ascertain the location of 
witnt'sses and other sources of proof. Moreover. the trial court 
must consider plaintiff's contention that she is domiciled in 
California. The trial court originally relied on defendant's 
affidavit that plaintiff was domiciled in Mexico, on the failure 
of plaintiff to file a counteraffidavit, on the ambiguity of 
plaintiff's allegation of residence in her complaint, and on 
points and authorities submitted by the partit's in deciding 
plaintiff was not a California domiciliary. On remand, plain-
tiff can submit further evidence of her domicile in this state. 
[7] A determination that a plaintiff is domiciled here would 
ordinarily preclude granting the defendant's motion for dis-
missal on the ground of forum non conveniens. (See Barrett, 
IN RE STERLING 
(63 C.M 
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C . ns 35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, D t · e of Forum Non onveme , The oc rm 
413-415.) . . prayed Let the peremptory wrIt ISsue as . 
McComb, J., Peters, J., 
and Burke, J., concurred. 
Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., 
